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ABSTRACT: 
 
The study of Chinese political economy has undergone a sea change since the late 
1990s; instead of debating the origins and direction of national reform, scholars have 
turned to examining the origins of local economic variation. This essay reviews recent 
work in regional political economy of contemporary China. In keeping with a movement 
in comparative politics toward analyzing subnational politics, the “new regionalists” seek 
to identify and explain meaningful heterogeneity in the Chinese polity and economy. Yet 
they go further than simply using subnational cases to generate or test theories about 
Chinese politics; instead, they propose that subnational political economies in China are a 
function of endogenous change rather than a reaction to national priorities. After 
identifying differences between “new regionalism” and previous studies of 
decentralization in China, I discuss this work according to the theoretical approaches 
(institutional, ideational, and socio-historical) used to explain the origins of regional 
differences. I conclude by examining the limitations of the new regionalist agenda in 
comparative and historical context and suggesting that scholars move past unconditional 
acceptance of the causal power of “socialist legacies” and instead attend to the 
importance of changes in the post-Mao administrative hierarchy. 
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Rawi Abdelal, Nara Dillon, Rick Doner, Kyle Jaros, Kristen Looney, Ben Read, and 
especially Sebastian Heilmann for comments on various drafts. I also appreciate critical comments from 
some of the authors of the books under review, and especially John Donaldson.       
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I. Disaggregating Economies in China and Beyond 
 
China is not one place. Increasingly, nowhere is. Fortunately, research methods in 
comparative politics are catching up to ever-expanding subnational variation in the 
political and economic phenomena. While approaches in comparative politics have 
historically focused primarily on national-level variables and, therefore, comparisons 
across countries, more recent approaches celebrate the importance of local-level variables 
and outcomes and make use of cases at the sub-national level to generate and test 
theories.
2 The subnational level of analysis has grown in importance so much recently 
that some scholars have identified a “subnational turn” in comparative politics.
3  
Such a turn has occurred in the field of Chinese politics as well. Research in the 
past, constrained by restricted access to the Mainland, focused on generalizing about 
politics in China from single case studies.
4 The great diversity of sources, written and 
fieldwork-based, that have emerged in the past twenty years with increased access, 
however, has given light to extensive variation within the Chinese polity with regard to a 
number of political phenomena.
5 Scholars have made use of this variation to generate and 
test hypotheses about outcomes as varied as public goods provision,
6 labor relations and 
the rule of law,
7 and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and restructuring.
8  
                                                 
2 On democratization and local authoritarianism, see Hagopian 1996, Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley 
1999, Gibson 2004. On state-building, see Ziblatt 2006. On public goods provision, see Tsai 2007. On civil 
war and/or ethnic conflict, see Kalyvas 2006, Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2006. 
3Ziblatt and Tsai 2009. The authors locate a number of sources of this trend: “decentralizing trends across 
the globe, a growing interest in politics ‘on the ground’ away from distant national capitals, the theoretical 
call to ‘disaggregate’ the state, as well as increased access to technological innovations such as easily 
accessible Geographic Information System (GIS) software that provide us with the opportunity to 
investigate more fine-grained spatial data” (p. 2). See also Snyder 2001. 
4 Chan, Madsen, Unger 1984, Walder 1986. 
5 Perry 1994. 
6 Tsai. 
7 Lee 2007. 
8 Steinfeld 1998.      
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The transition from “national models” to subnational ones has been even more 
pronounced in the subfield of Chinese political economy. The debates that motivated the 
field in the 1990s involved the advantages and disadvantages of China’s “gradualist” 
approach,
9 whether Chinese growth was a function of gradualism or occurred in spite of 
it,
10 and whether and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could preside over 
phenomenal economic growth without institutions, such as property rights and contract 
enforcement, deemed requisite for sustained prosperity.
11 Observing that, thirty years 
after reforms began in 1978, China continues to show little likelihood of adopting the 
institutions of advanced industrial democracies, scholars have in the past ten years turned 
their attention to identifying and explaining subnational variation in economic 
development and reform in China. Rather than treating the Chinese economy as en route 
from socialism to an identifiable form of capitalism, they are instead examining how 
subnational differences in the organization of economic activities and the nature of 
market mechanisms have emerged and what implications they have for a “national” 
Chinese growth model. How have local governments differently interpreted and 
implemented national reform policies? What explains different decision-making 
regarding investments and growth strategies? How have different local growth strategies 
beget different socioeconomic consequences?  
  In this review essay, I take stock of six books that bring regional variation in 
patterns of growth, innovation, and investment to the fore in research on the political 
economy of reform and development in China. All of these authors, though they analyze 
phenomena as diverse as industrial policy, property rights, labor politics, and rural 
                                                 
9 Naughton 1995. 
10 Sachs and Wing Thye 2000, Rawski 1995. 
11 Clarke 2003, Oi 1999, Oi and Walder 1999, Shirk 1993.      
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poverty, take regional variation as the basis for subnational comparison and identify 
local—as opposed to national—level political factors as key independent variables. In 
this sense, they are not only interested in variation in economic outcomes, but variation in 
local economic orders, or the very logic of economic decision-making and patterns of 
behavior.
12 Importantly, these authors do not treat all subnational units as equal or even 
similar; instead, they emphasize fundamental differences in regional political 
arrangements, economic institutions, and relations to the center. They differ, however, in 
their assessments of the causal power of institutional arrangements, political and social 
histories, and locally held norms and ideas about the economy in the origins and 
reproduction of regional differences. I first examine this recent work in light of studies of 
“decentralization” in China and beyond, and then discuss models of regional difference 
according to what kinds of local level factors the various authors emphasize. The last 
section critically examines this growing research agenda. I first identify conceptual and 
theoretical limitations of this “new regionalism” in light of research in comparative 
political economy and the Chinese historical tradition and conclude by critically 
discussing the causal power of “socialist legacies” and suggesting ways in which changes 
to the post-Mao political hierarchy may explain critical differences among regions.
13  
                                                 
12 I borrow the term “economic order” from Gary Herrigel’s (1996) book on regional economic orders in 
Germany, discussed below. Herrigel uses “order” rather than, say, “industrial organization” or “industrial 
structure” to signal the use of a “broader lens to analyze economic practice” (pp. 22-3). This “broader lens” 
certainly describes the books under review here.   
13 This essay does not review empirical work on the growing regional disparities and regional inequalities 
that mark the Chinese political economic landscape. These inequalities are the subject of a large literature, 
produced mostly by geographers, economists, and policy analysts, which mostly debates whether these 
inequalities in wealth, growth, social welfare, and investment, are a “natural” stage of economic growth and 
will disappear in due time or they are direct products of China’s spatially differentiated growth policies. 
The books under review here, all by political scientists, are not about whether economic indicators and 
outcomes vary across China—an empirical reality that they would certainly accept as given—but instead 
about how the fundamental rules of governing the economy differ. For the geographer’s perspective, see 
Fan 1995, Fan 1997, Wang and Hu 1999. For economists on regional inequality, see introductory chapter      
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II. Beyond Decentralization: Local Politics as Subject 
  The division of authority between different levels of government has loomed 
large in accounts of the course of Chinese reforms and the growth miracle. The central 
puzzles have been 1) the role of political and fiscal decentralization in China’s economic 
reforms and the CCP’s political resilience, and 2) how to understand the limits of local 
autonomy and, relatedly, the limits of central authority.  
Those that attribute China’s political resilience and economic success to political 
and fiscal decentralization make a number of arguments about the importance of local 
autonomy over economic decisions: local autonomy guards against potential incursions 
of central authorities, generates fiscal incentives for local officials to pursue growth and 
restructure the state-owned economy, and encourages local reform experiments.
14 In this 
view, China’s reforms, and therefore its explosive economic growth, have been “bottom-
up,” stimulated at the local level: “Experimentation, learning, and adaptation all follow 
from the inception of local political freedom over the economy.”
15 Another strain of 
scholarship instead emphasizes the role of strong central control over diverse subnational 
actors as both a driver of reform and a reason why the CCP has maintained political 
control in the face of economic change. These scholars do not dispute that the Chinese 
system is politically and fiscally decentralized in important ways, but they contest the 
idea that decentralization can explain economic success and instead focus on the ways in 
                                                                                                                                               
by Shue and Wong and chapters by Wong and Riskin in Shue and Wong 2007, Fan, Kanbur and Zhang 
2009, Wong 1997. On the policy side, see UNDP, World Bank, and CCP White Paper on Inequality 2001. 
14 For a thorough—and critical—review of these arguments, see Cai and Treisman 2006. 
15 Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995, 78. See also Lau, Qian and Roland 2000.      
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which Beijing retains firm control over subnational actors.
16 In this view, the 
directionality of innovation and reforms is “top-down;” policy directions are set at the 
“commanding heights” in Beijing, and subnational actors vie for promotion within a 
hierarchical party-state by meeting those objectives or attaching themselves to one elite 
faction.
17  
The authors of books under review here—to whom I’ll refer as the “new 
regionalists”— depart from this debate in two important ways. First, instead of staking a 
claim in the importance of local versus central authority in Chinese political institutions, 
these authors emphasize the causal power of the system’s endemic uncertainty and under-
institutionalization. Envisioning the Chinese political system as something akin to 
federalism, in their view, is a misreading of the relationship between levels of the 
Chinese state. Local officials are not reacting to clear direction and identifiable incentives 
embedded in China’s political institutions, but rather making do with the resources they 
have in a climate of ambiguity.
18 Adam Segal (2003) and Dan Breznitz & Michael 
Murphree (2011) make this argument most explicitly. Segal explains that national 
uncertainty about the meaning of minying enterprises—“people run,” clearly not state-
owned but not necessarily private—led different localities to interpret the new category 
of ownership in different ways (pp. 39-42). These varying levels of state intervention 
based on those interpretations created different regional political economies in the 
information technology (IT) sector. Breznitz & Murphree go even further, characterizing 
                                                 
16 See Edin 2003, Landry 2008. 
17 Cai and Treisman (2006) make this case most explicitly. They argue that what looks to others to be 
“bottom-up” experimentation and policy innovation is in fact “competition at the center between rival 
factions, with different ideological predispositions and local connections” (p. 507). This account is similar 
to one offered by Victor Shih (2008) to explain inflationary cycles and fiscal policy.  
18 This way of thinking of the power of uncertainty is somewhat similar to the constructivist account of 
decision-making, though, save Segal, these authors do not refer to the constructivist literature.      
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the key element of the Chinese political system to be “structured uncertainty,” which they 
define as “a part of the institutional system, although a part that prevents its 
‘institutionalization’ by ensuring that instead of patterns of behavior becoming 
routinized, a multiplicity of behaviors can be followed on a specific subject without any 
of the actors knowing in advance which behaviors are appropriate” (p. 12).
20 Critically, 
this uncertainty and ambiguity is not at all a product of reform-era decentralization, but 
rather is a continuation of a distinctly Chinese political tradition that values a lack of 
institutionalization and bureaucratic routinization. Other scholars, such as Sebastian 
Heilmann, Elizabeth Perry, and the contributors to their edited volume, Mao’s Invisible 
Hand, have located the origins of this practice in China’s revolutionary tradition, 
highlighting the ways in which contemporary policy-making through experimentation has 
its roots in the early days of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary bases before 
1949: “China’s revolution gave rise to a ‘guerilla-style policy-making’ approach that 
proved capable of generating an array of creative—productive as well as evasive—tactics 
for managing sudden change and uncertainty.”
21 “Structured uncertainty,” then, is an 
intentional element of the broader Chinese political system, and local governments work 
within their own resources and constraints to formulate local policy without a clear 
understanding of what actions are and are not permitted.
22  
The new regionalists depart from previous research on the reforms in a second 
significant way: instead of using local realities to shed light on how China’s national 
political and economic system works, they are examining how local level variables 
                                                 
20 For a similar interpretation of how local actors (state and non-state) pushed the boundaries of 
permissibility with informal finance, see Tsai 2002. 
21 Heilmann and Perry 2011, p. 7. See also Heilmann 2008a, Heilmann 2008b. 
22 Heilmann and Perry refer to “local government on a shoestring” to describe how “localities are generally 
left to fend for themselves, receiving only erratic and episodic central support” (p. 14).      
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determine different local economic realities. These scholars are not using localities as 
cases to illustrate the importance of a single variable or even a single causal process, but 
rather argue that a great deal of economic and political change might best be thought of 
as endogenous to local units, a product of local realities rather than simply different 
reactions to national priorities. In this sense, the new regionalism possesses a different 
ontology from previous work in Chinese political economy in that it rejects any concept 
of local governments or subnational units as homogenous.
23 Of course, the previous 
generation of scholarship does not claim that these units are actually “homogenous,” but 
theories that emphasize inter-jurisdictional competition
24 or competition for promotion in 
a hierarchical party-state assume that local actors in China are responding the same 
incentives and constraints in formulating policy.  
New regionalist scholars would reject the idea that one province or city can easily 
redirect to adopt the tactic of another. Thun puts it strongly: “Local governments are not 
utility-maximizing unitary actors that simply respond to the incentives created by a 
central government, they are political jurisdictions that have long political and economic 
histories and distinct institutional structures” (p. 17). Segal is also explicit that he is not 
testing hypotheses about national level political and economic relationships, but focusing 
on “local institutions, local constraints, and local politics”: “The point is not simply that 
looking at regional economies provides a level of detail and nuance not available in 
studies focusing on national economies. Rather the lack of uniformity at the regional 
level in many economies makes local-level analysis a necessity” (pp. 164-165). To be 
sure, none of these authors is inattentive to decisions and preferences at the central level; 
                                                 
23 This point is inspired by Ziblatt and Tsai’s account of what they call “classic subnational analysis. Ziblatt 
and Tsai. 
24 Montinola, Qian and Weingast.      
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central-local relations serve as key independent variables explaining subnational 
divergence in Donaldson’s, Thun’s, and Hurst’s formulations, and central policy toward 
the IT industry sets the stage for local interpretation in books by Segal and Breznitz & 
Murphree. As Hurst puts it, “The nature and behavior of the central state still matter, but 
the main action is at the subnational level and the most fruitful research is at this lower 
level of analysis” (pp. 4-5).  
 
III.  Sources of Variation: Institutions, Ideas, and History in the New Regionalism 
 
Scholars working in a  “new regionalist” framework share an acceptance of the 
power of uncertainty in China, an ontology that celebrates local heterogeneity and 
endogenous change, and a view that not just economic outcomes but the more 
fundamental rules of state-economy relations differ regionally in China. If the “new 
regionalists” share these important notions, they do not necessarily agree on what the 
appropriate subnational unit of analysis and comparison ought be, or what variables or 
processes are most relevant in determining differences. In this section, I discuss the 
dominant theoretical models explaining the sources of regional political economic 
differences. 
 
Institutions 
One emergent theme in the new regionalism is the importance of local level 
government institutions in explaining divergent patterns of investment and intervention in 
Chinese political economy. Drawing on the “historical institutionalism” tradition in      
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comparative politics, this work emphasizes how local institutional differences have 
emerged and gained in importance during the reform period.
28 Books by Susan Whiting 
(2000) and Eric Thun (2006) particularly emphasize path-dependence in local 
institutional development, meaning that institutions develop in ways that give rise to 
positive feedback and institutional complementarities, which further entrench the original 
institutional developments. The differences, therefore, become durable and somewhat 
sclerotic over time. Yet both authors take care not to neglect the power of Beijing, instead 
theorizing how institutions at different levels of the Chinese state interact.  
  Although scholars had predicted the emergence of localism in rural China at the 
onset of the reforms,
29 Susan Whiting (2000) was among the first political scientists to 
thoroughly document and explain subnational variation in the post-reform countryside.
30 
Her puzzle began with diversity in emergent forms of property rights in rural industry: 
given claims of homogenization during the Maoist period, how do we account for 
regional patterns of industrial ownership? Her cases are counties in the mid-coastal 
region in the provinces of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, where she observes that some 
county governments support primarily public (collective) rural industrial ownership 
(Town and Village Enterprises, TVEs) while others host predominantly privately-owned 
rural enterprises. The explanation she gives emphasizes the role of institutions and 
institutional change.    
  In her formulation, different rural governments supported different forms of 
property rights because they possessed different resource endowments and constraints 
                                                 
28 Pierson 2000, Thelen 2003. 
29 Shue 1988. 
30 See also Chŏng 2000. Chung’s book was one of the first to examine local variation in decentralization, 
reacting to research that emphasized the power of farmers’ (perhaps unorganized) movements and the 
central state and elided the importance of local government. See Kelliher 1992, Zhou 1996.      
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inherited from the Maoist period. Specifically, some counties inherited strong collective 
enterprises from Mao era rural industrialization while others were forced to rely on the 
strength of private initiatives.
31 Property rights in rural industry then shaped the 
development of different extractive institutions: officials in townships with collective 
enterprises had incentives to collude with those enterprises to evade taxes, and townships 
with private enterprises innovated different ways to resolve information problems and 
lower costs of collecting taxes from the sector. These “institutional complementarities” 
between forms of property rights and extractive practices are mutually reinforcing, 
creating “apparent path-dependence in the trajectories of rural industrial development in 
each region” (Whiting, 3). These claims are based on extensive documentary analysis of 
county fiscal and industrial histories, a product of unique access achieved by a skilled 
field researcher.  
Eric Thun (2006) makes a similar argument to Whiting’s regarding the 
importance of institutional variation but focuses on relationships between local politics, 
foreign direct investment, and the automobile industry. His motivating question is how 
“two decades of reform have prepared state-owned Chinese auto firms for the challenge 
of globalization,” a challenge he breaks down by examining how Chinese firms use FDI 
in the context of local level institutions (p. 7). He tracks how different localities 
(Shanghai, Guangzhou, Beijing, Changchun, and Wuhan) differently structure the local 
institutions that govern the auto industry. Theorizing that they interact with the form of 
                                                 
31 I take up a more thorough discussion of the Maoist period in a section on socialist legacies below.      
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local inter-firm relations, he finds that some local institutional environments are superior 
to others in achieving success in the auto sector.
34  
The institutions in Thun’s model are both the internal structure of local 
bureaucracies and central-local relations. The ways in which local governments organize 
the bureaucratic agencies that deal with the auto industry and the degree of fragmentation 
determine the kind and degree of local state intervention in the economy. The Shanghai 
municipal government successfully established a new office in charge of localizing 
supply for the industry and coordinating oversight and investment; Beijing and 
Guangzhou did not. Perhaps surprisingly, Thun credits both cities’ relationships with the 
center in inhibiting effective investment: in the case of Guangzhou, distance from the 
center presented too many alternatives to the auto industry (pp. 156-159), and in the case 
of Beijing, closeness to the center made local officials prioritize the country over the 
municipality (pp. 164-165). Central-local relations also inhibited localization of firm 
successes in Wuhan and Changchun because of central ownership of SOEs and “limited 
maneuvering ability of local actors” (p. 176). Therefore while local level institutions vary 
in important ways, these differences are in part a product of central-local relations.
38 
Dan Breznitz & Michael Murphree (2011), writing about what they call different 
regional innovation systems in the Information Technology (IT) industry, also discuss 
“institutions,” but in a way altogether different from varying local bureaucratic structures. 
Emphasizing the role of “structural uncertainty” and conservative central institutions, 
                                                 
34 Thun measures “success” in two ways. First, the market share captured by any given firm. In 2002, the 
Shanghai firm had 32% of the domestic sedan market, while the Wuhan and Changchun firms had 25% and 
10% respectively. Shanghai, however, has been the more successful story because it succeeded in 
promoting local suppliers for the joint-venture, and therefore translating firm success into growth for the 
local economy. See p. 61.  
38 Thun’s book includes a critique of the “decentralization-experimentation” literature, which he argues 
neglects both local realities and the power of Beijing (pp. 15-18).      
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they posit that China is separated into “a series of regional economic fiefdoms” in which 
“each region develops a unique set of capacities,” the sum of which “enables China to 
dominate at many stages of the fragmented global economy yet inhibits business and 
entrepreneurs from engaging in cutting-edge, and highly risky, novel technology and 
products development” (p. 21). Regional diversity, for them, is less about the re-
emergence of pre-reform differences than it is about how competition among regions 
produces specialization and, as a result, diversifies the national portfolio of economic 
strengths in China. They are less than precise about why the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and 
Shanghai look different, referring to the causal power of “politics” without specifying 
how local politics may really differ.
40 They do make mention of factors such as Maoist 
legacies of economic organization, the timing and sequencing of FDI and market 
freedoms, and localities’ relationships with the central government, but lack a theoretical 
explanation for how those factors affect patterns of state investment and intervention and 
which factors matter more than others. The book’s innovation is the argument that 
China’s overall economic innovation strategy—production-stage rather than product 
innovation—is sustainable because regions within China are establishing something that 
looks like comparative advantages in different stages of the manufacturing process: “the 
diverse regional strengths of China ensure that even if one of its regional systems suffers 
a downturn, China as a whole will continue to flourish” (p. 19). While this may be true, 
without a more systematic understanding of why some regions adopt the “regional 
innovation systems” they do, the book reads more as a description of differences among 
                                                 
40 They write, for example, “We argue that the Chinese development trajectory is the direct result of 
politics…specifically, political action that transferred the main loci of reforms from the center to the 
regions” (p. 11).       
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Beijing, Shanghai, and the PRD in particular, rather than an explanation of how 
differences emerge. 
 
Ideas 
The importance attached to institutional sources of regional variation does not 
exclude an understanding of how ideational or cultural variables are also at play.
41 Adam 
Segal, in his (2003) book on variation in patterns of investment and business-government 
relations in the IT industry, marries the two approaches: “the constraints on policymakers 
are both material and ideational” (p. 48). Segal finds that the same institutional 
arrangements that proved ineffective in fostering growth in the auto industry were quite 
effective in the IT industry.
42 In Beijing, the local government provided guidance to 
entrepreneurs while still allowing them sufficient autonomy, while in Shanghai and Xi’an 
the local governments provided support for the sector (in the form of investment, loans, 
coordinating of FDI), but meddled injuriously in internal enterprise management. In 
Guangzhou, the local government neither aided nor impeded the IT sector (p. 16).  
  For Segal, local institutional patterns are remnants of the socialist period,
43 but 
their effect is critically linked to developmental outcomes through the intervening 
variable of local culture:  
[local officials] also relied on traditional ideas about how to organize economic 
activity. These beliefs were widely shared among and provided guidance to local 
                                                 
41 For examples of a constructivist approach in comparative political economy and international political 
economy literature outside of China, see Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons 2010, Hall 1986, Herrera 2005, 
Abdelal 2001. 
42 The importance of “fit” or “mismatch” between local institutions and specific sectors is the subject of an 
article by Segal and Thun combining their findings on the IT and auto industries. Segal and Thun 2001. 
43 His approach also emphasizes path-dependence: “Even when government officials have the desire and 
political support to build new institutions, they often find their range of policy options narrowed by past 
institutional arrangements. The future cannot be made independent of the past” (p. 25).       
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officials on how enterprises should be organized, how enterprises should relate to 
each other, and how they should interact with the local government. (p. 5)  
 
An example of ideas at work comes from Segal’s study of the ways in which officials in 
Shanghai conceptualized the task of investment in the Science and Technology system. 
Even after decentralization, Segal says that, in Shanghai, “[t]he methods of central 
planning were internalized and reproduced” as the local government took the lead in a 
strategy of “high input, high risk, and a high level of reliance on government guidance” 
(p. 92). It was not necessarily structural or institutional conditions that precipitated this 
strategy, but instead that Shanghai economic planners were simply doing as they had 
always done when they decided to promote the IT industry.   
  John Donaldson’s (2011) book on rural poverty alleviation emphasizes the power 
of ideas in an altogether different way: through the intervening variable of leadership. He 
investigates the relationships between state-market relations, economic growth, and 
poverty alleviation through a paired comparison of two provinces in Southwest China 
that constitute “exceptions to the correlation” between growth and poverty reduction; 
Yunnan province has grown at a fast pace while absolute poverty has increased, and 
Guizhou province has experienced dramatic reductions in the poverty rate while growth 
has been relatively sluggish (p. 3). The choice of cases—neighboring provinces that share 
common political histories, large minority populations, and similar geographies—allows 
Donaldson to tease out the effects of differential provincial development strategies on the 
poorest of residents. The argument he develops privileges the importance of four factors 
in reducing rural poverty, each of which is presented in a separate chapter: road 
construction, migration, tourism policies, and coal mining. In general, authorities in 
Yunnan province implemented development strategies that primarily benefited cities,      
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targeted GDP growth, and encouraged large-scale industries, while their counterparts in 
Guizhou focused explicitly on poverty reduction, encouraging industries and projects that 
did not dramatically increase GDP but in which poor people could participate directly.
46 
  But why did Guizhou and Yunnan diverge? Donaldson locates the answer in the 
personal experiences and ideas of provincial leaders. He considers three key potential 
factors that work together in varying degrees of importance: central government 
influence, initial characteristics of provinces, and attributes of individual provincial 
leaders.
47 He carefully considers the advice of central leaders to the two provinces, but 
rules out that explanation based on timing. He does find evidence that constraints from 
the center, in the form of central dependence on large tobacco industries and international 
trade and therefore interference in Yunnan, partly explain why Guizhou seemed freer to 
implement policies that generated little growth but did benefit the poor. Instead of 
emphasizing competition for promotion, Donaldson attributes different choices in policy 
targets chiefly to the idiosyncratic backgrounds of provincial leaders. Guizhou’s leaders 
had ties to the province’s poorest counties and “were motivated by specific ideas about 
how rural poverty should be addressed and by a nuanced multidimensional view of how 
to measure economic success that transcended simple measures of GDP.” In contrast, the 
highest officials in Yunnan were either originally from or had served at length in the 
wealthiest parts of the province and were “more interested in implementing growth-
oriented policies that promoted industries that benefitted their home areas” (p. 56). These 
individually-held ideas—different from local norms and cultures of the kind Segal 
discusses—explain initial divergence in policy in these two provinces, after which path-
                                                 
46 Donaldson provides an excellent summary of these approaches in the introductory and concluding 
chapters. I discuss his local state models in greater detail in Section IV.  
47 See also Donaldson 2009.      
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dependence sets in: “once a particular course was set and had received central support, a 
form of path-dependency caused the strategy to continue even after the original leaders 
had departed” (p. 37). 
 
Social and Political History 
Explaining regional variation in terms of different histories of political and social 
integration into the larger nation is perhaps the most classic form of subnational analysis 
in comparative politics. Research on phenomena as varied as party systems, state-
building, and regimes has taken social processes of integration as formative “critical 
junctures” that hold long term consequences for the ways in which nation-states are 
organized.
50 Many scholars have taken this kind of analysis to the subnational level, 
arguing that subnational patterns of state-society relations remain durable even during 
periods of change at the national level.
51 William Hurst, in his (2009) book on the politics 
of laid-off workers, foregrounds the legacies of industrialization and state-society 
relations as key sources of regional difference. The book is organized into chapters based 
on the outcomes he aims to explain: pattern of layoffs, state response, re-employment, 
and worker contention. The key explanatory variable is the form of “working class 
society,” produced by differential processes of industrialization and working class 
formation.  
  Hurst’s model features four regions: the Northeast, North-Central China, upper 
Changjiang, and the Central Coast. The Northeast was settled by migrants who identified 
primarily with the enterprise and therefore embraced political activism as members of a 
                                                 
50 Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Moore 1966, Ziblatt. 
51 This approach is most epitomized by work by Rick Locke and Gary Herrigel, which I discuss below. In 
addition, see Hagopian.       
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working class. The tradition of labor activism in the Central Coast region, centered 
mostly in the cities of Shanghai and Tianjin, has been nationalistic and radical, 
positioning a domestic workforce against foreign owner-managers. The North-Central 
region was industrialized and “proletarianized” after 1949 by smaller state firms. Small 
firms meant that workers were never as closely identified with the enterprise, and worker 
activism has never been as strong in this region. The Upper Changjiang experienced 
industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s and again in the period of the “Third Front.” 
Social life there is more rooted in the enterprise than even the Northeast, especially when 
firms were located in remote and mountainous areas and settled by transplants. His 
research sites (Benxi city in Liaoning; Shanghai; Chongqing; and Datong and Luoyang) 
are chosen based on their representativeness of these regions.  
Hurst’s “historical-social” approach aims to be more comprehensive in viewing 
sources of regional variation and is certainly the most ambitious in its aim to “divide 
China into meaningful subnational units.”
52 On the other hand, the sheer number of 
variables that Hurst identifies—in addition to the tripartite “working class society” 
variable,
53 he sees local state capacity, the general business environment for SOEs, 
market opportunities for alternative employment, and central-local relations as key 
“dimensions of contemporary regional political economy” (p. 26-27)—complicates any 
easy extraction of a causal theory from the book. On the other hand, the empirical nuance 
                                                 
52 Hurst p. 16: “While regional analysis is not unknown in the study of China, the particular type of 
subnational analysis employed here has not been widely used by China scholars. Specifically, I first seek to 
divide China into meaningful subnational units. This is a step that previous scholarship has often paid 
insufficient attention to.” He cities C.K. Lee’s book on labor activism and the law in China, which analyzes 
“rust-belt” versus “sub-belt” patterns of organization and state-society relations. These are not regions in 
literal space, but rather represent the different politics of laid-off and migrant labor. Lee 2007. 
53 Hurst defines “working class society” as “a three-dimensional concept encompassing class identity (i.e. 
workers’ view of themselves as members of a working class), the structure of works’ social ties, and 
popular perceptions of the Maoist past” (p. 27).      
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and richness provided by Hurst’s extensive fieldwork make the book both a vivid read 
and an important record of labor politics at a critical moment in Chinese political history. 
The complex relationship between the party-state and its erstwhile proletariat does not, as 
Hurst reveals, lend itself to parsimonious description.  
 
IV. Limitations and Opportunities of the New Regionalism 
 
  Having described the new regionalism and some of its contributions, in this 
section I discuss its limitations and suggest fruitful paths for future research. First, I 
discuss the “new” regionalism in light of the “old regionalism,” or literatures in both 
comparative political economy and Chinese history that have influenced the books under 
review here. Compared with comparative and historical approaches to regional political 
economy, contemporary research lacks the kind of methodological and conceptual clarity 
that would propel this research agenda forward and allow application to more general 
economic phenomena. Lastly, I probe how the new regionalism thus far has suffered 
from excessive emphasis on the causal power of socialist legacies, and discuss 
opportunities to explore both the power of post-Mao administrative changes and central-
local dynamics.  
 
Regional Political Economies in Comparative and Historical Perspective 
“The Italian economy should be viewed not as a coherent national system but rather as an 
incoherent composite of diverse subnational patterns that coexist (often uneasily) within 
the same national territory.”
55 
 
                                                 
55 Locke 1995, 3.      
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The above quote, which is reproduced or paraphrased in books by Segal (p. 8), 
Hurst (p. 6), and Thun (p. 14), comes from Richard Locke’s seminal book on the 
importance of the region in Italian political economy. Locke’s puzzle began with 
simultaneous characterizations of the Italian economy as experiencing “entrepreneurial 
dynamism” and “industrial decline” during economic adjustment efforts in the 1970s and 
1980s. The book takes on both a “national models” school, which would prescribe 
overhauling Italy’s national institutions to make them more efficient, and an 
“evolutionist” vision of Italian economic change, which would predict that all regions of 
Italy will eventually adopt the practices of successful industrial clusters. Instead, Locke 
discovers enduring local economic orders that differ in the structure of intergroup 
relations, patterns of associationalism, and links to the national center. These differences 
“shaped the alternative conceptions and strategies of local economic actors,” explaining 
why firms in different regions reacted to and weathered industrial adjustment very 
differently (p. 21).  
  But Locke argues that these local economic orders have survived far more than 
the attempts at national industrial policy formation and efforts to re-launch economic 
planning. He locates the origins of these different regional economic orders in the legacy 
of “Italy’s uneven political and economic development in which different areas were 
industrialized and enfranchised at different times” (p. 23). His focus, then, is on how 
regional orders are reproduced—and, conversely, efforts at reform or standardization are 
resisted—through “micropolitical” (i.e., agentic, rather than structurally determined) 
actions filtered through local sociopolitical networks. He documents how economic      
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behavior on the part of firms, unions, management, and workers, within the same 
industries (automobiles and textiles) in response to similar challenges, differed by region.  
  Gary Herrigel, in a book published just a year after Locke’s, similarly challenges 
“whole nation bias” in his account of industrialization and industrial orders in Germany. 
Questioning the classic Gerschenkronian account of Germany as the paradigmatic case of 
“late industrialization,” Herrigel argues that only part of the German economy can be 
accurately characterized as “highly centralized, large-firm dominated, ultimately neo-
corporatist,” and instead that “two distinct, parallel, and internationally competitive 
systems of industrial organization and practice, located in different regions, have 
characterized the German experience at all levels of the economy and society since the 
very onset of industrialization.”
56 The book tracks how two “industrial orders” in 
Germany, one which fits the Gerschenkronian characterization and the other which 
Herrigel calls “decentralized,” originated and functioned during the period of German 
industrialization before World War II and were reconstituted and governed in the post-
war period of growth.
57 Like Locke, Herrigel locates the origins of these regional orders 
in divergent processes of industrialization: the decentralized order emerged from what 
was a smallholder property system with a “preindustrial infrastructure of craft skills,” and 
the autarkic system emerged from late industrialization.
58  
  The mere discovery of heterogeneity in Italy and Germany was not the major 
contribution of either of these books.
59 These books are important in comparative 
                                                 
56 Herrigel 1996, 1. The term “whole nation bias” originally from Rokkan 1970. 
57 Herrigel also writes two chapters, one on the period 1871 – 1945 and one on the period 1945 – 1994, on 
how these different orders were accommodated in national governance institutions.  
58 Herrigel 1996, 20. 
59 Scholars of Italian politics and political economy had homed in on the divergence between Northern and 
Southern Italy for quite some time. Robert Putnam’s seminal book on social capital and differences in      
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political economy—and formative for scholars working in subnational political 
economy—because of the explanations offered for how regional differences originate and 
are reproduced, especially during periods of economic change and industrial adjustment. 
It is revealing that both Locke and Herrigel take a decidedly constructivist tack in 
explaining how different regional political economies work and are reproduced. In light 
of the literature to which these authors were responding, this is not altogether surprising. 
Both were self-consciously reacting to “national models” schools that looked for 
institutional differences across nation-states and then “often assumes that certain national 
systems with particular organizational features are more ‘mature’ and/or ‘efficient’ than 
others and prescribes the active diffusion or replication of these ‘best (institutional) 
practices’ across nations.”
60 Instead, both attach causal importance to the ways in which 
agents “on the ground,” embedded in social and political networks, conceive of problems 
and formulate strategies than to the fixed power of “background conditions, constraints, 
and structures of an environment.”
61 Regional economic orders endure, then, because of 
the ways in which they condition and habituate local actors to make decisions rather than 
because of the enduring presence of specific institutional arrangements or structural 
conditions.  
If the political science intellectual forbears of the “new regionalism” are 
decidedly constructivist, the dominant understanding of subnational economic activity in 
China is unmistakably structural. The anthropologist G. William Skinner first brought the 
                                                                                                                                               
political organization between South and North was published two years prior to Locke’s book. Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti 1993. 
60 Locke 1995, 13. Locke cites work in the “institutionalist” tradition here (i.e. Hall 1986, Garrett and 
Lange 1986, Zysman 1983.) as well as a more constructivist tradition (i.e. Katzenstein 1978.) See Locke 
1995, 13 fn. 15. 
61 Herrigel 1996, 23.      
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question “how do we ascertain the territorial extent of an economic system?” to the fore 
in research on Chinese economic and political history. Skinner began his investigation 
into the spatial and temporal patterning of Chinese economic, social, and political life at 
the level of “marketing systems,” territories larger than the village that formed the basis 
for social and economic interactions and behavior in rural China. Skinner sought to 
displace the village and the political administrative unit as the units of analysis of rural 
life, and instead implored researchers to let “the data themselves tell us,” by which he 
meant “patterning in the flows of goods and services, money and credit, and the like.”
62 
From the lowest level of granulation—the standard marketing system—Skinner moved 
his reevaluation of the spatial patterning of Chinese history to the regional level. He 
hypothesized that China consisted of nine “macroregions,” differentiated by 
physiographic features, in which distinctive patterns of economic interaction emerged: 
“To consider units that cover only part of a macroregion is to wrench out of context a 
more or less arbitrary portion of a systemic whole.”
63 
Though Skinner’s work encountered no small amount of conceptual and empirical 
criticism, few would disagree that the “macroregion” approach to Chinese history 
constituted a paradigm shift.
64 Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects Skinner’s 
characterization of regions or claims about their role in Chinese history, as a theory of 
regional economic variation, Skinner’s “macroregionalism” has much to recommend it. 
First, Skinner’s theory is exceedingly clear, perhaps at the risk of oversimplifying within-
region variation, about what constitutes a “region” and its boundaries. Macroregions are 
delimited by drainage basins of major rivers and consist of local place hierarchies, and 
                                                 
62 Skinner 1985, 287-8. 
63 Skinner and Baker 1977, 217. 
64 For a thorough and critical discussion of the “macroregion” as paradigm, see Cartier 2002.      
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the patterning of economic and social activity becomes sparser as one approaches a 
regional boundary.
65 Second, Skinner’s theory consists of propositions both for how 
regional economies originate (physiographic differences) and how they endure over time. 
In fact, Skinner argued that once Chinese history is viewed in appropriate spatial terms, 
systematic temporal patterns become discernable as well.
66 Macroregional socio-
economies were reproduced not only during natural disasters and periods of population 
growth and decline (the effects of which were limited by macroregional boundaries). 
Perhaps ironically, imperial level decisions themselves served to reproduce regional 
limits. Skinner details how, for example, developments such as the movement of imperial 
capitals or regional trade monopolies (e.g. in Canton in 1757) ignited cycles of rise and 
decline in various regions.
67  
With the exception of Segal, Donaldson, and Hurst, who cite Skinner’s work, 
none of the authors of the “new regionalism” deal seriously with the “old” version of 
Chinese political and economic regions.
68 In some ways, leaving the old regionalism out 
of the new regionalism makes sense. These scholars are all political scientists focused on 
state intervention in the economy and to whom a deterministic theory of physiographic 
regions would not likely appeal. Moreover, Skinner’s theory—and the data he culled to 
test it—were decidedly pre-industrial. For Locke and Herrigel, the process of 
industrialization itself created different regions. The new regionalists, interested in 
industrial and post-industrial issues such as labor politics, innovation, and sector specific 
                                                 
65 Skinner and Baker. 
66 Ibid.: 11. 
67 Ibid.: 217-219.  
68 Segal (p. 9) and Hurst (p. 7) cite Skinner briefly as a forerunner of their arguments about regional 
diversity, while Donaldson cites Skinner’s substantive perspective on market towns.       
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adjustment, would not have much use for studies of the spatial patterning of pre-industrial 
life.  
It is in the methodological and conceptual senses that the new regionalists could 
borrow effectively from both the old. First, although all of the books discussed here use 
the term “region” in some way, the authors could be much more explicit about the 
characterization and scale of a “region” with respect to the outcomes they are 
explaining.
69 Thun and Segal are dealing exclusively with urban governments: Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangzhou, Changchun, and Wuhan for Thun, and Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, 
and Guangzhou for Segal. Some of these cities enjoy provincial status (meaning that they 
are governed directly by the center rather than by an additional provincial structure), and 
these administrative hierarchies feature prominently in how Thun and Segal explain 
variation among the cities.
70 Yet Thun and Segal write about “local officials” in these 
cities as if they are comparable to, say, the county and township level “local officials” in 
Whiting’s work. While the more generic focus puts their work in dialogue with earlier 
work on “local states,”
71 the omission of any discussion urban politics as such seems 
curious.  
Donaldson invokes provincial policies to explain provincial differences in poverty 
conditions; although we may quibble that the county is the more appropriate unit of 
                                                 
69 Geographers have produced a large literature on the concept of scale. This literature, which explores the 
relationship between social and economic processes and dynamic geographic scales, could be useful for 
political scientists attempting to understand the centralization and decentralization of various political 
processes. See Brenner 2004, Cartier 2005. 
70 “Central-local relations” serves as an important condition in both accounts, but both authors could be 
much clearer about how they expect provincial status to affect patterns of investment and intervention. In a 
very real sense, Xi’an and Shanghai or Shanghai and Changchun are not comparable units, a point to which 
I will return in Section VI.  
71 Oi 1999.      
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analysis at which to analyze rural poverty, Donaldson’s research design is very clear.
72 
Hurst, in this book and elsewhere, is more attentive to the comparison of cities.
73 He 
chose as field sites cities within the regions he identified as representative of the 
“dimensions of contemporary regional political economy:” “sectoral distribution of 
SOEs, timing and manner of industrialization, location of SOEs, relative presence of 
market activity and commercial centers, transportation infrastructure, and historical 
relationship with the central government” (p. 31). Though, as noted above, Hurst 
certainly runs the risk of bringing too many independent variables to bear on the 
outcomes he aims to explain, his identification of the units of analysis is clear enough to 
permit the some generalization. By this I mean that we would be able to take any city in 
China and generate some expectations about labor politics there based on Hurst’s 
formulation.  
Breznitz & Murphree are perhaps the least precise in characterizing the unit of 
analysis. They examine what they call “regional innovation systems” in the information 
technology industry, comparing Beijing (“a city of start-ups”), Shanghai (“a large-scale 
industrial structure”), and the Pearl River Delta (a “resilient” industrial structure built 
“seemingly out of nothing”). Beijing and Shanghai are, of course, centrally administered 
cities of 20 and 23 million respectively, and the PRD is an urban agglomeration 
encompassing eight Mainland cities and over 120 million people.
75 Breznitz & Murphree 
make a strong case that these “regions” differ in their innovation systems and patterns of 
state-industry relations, but give no guidance as to what other systems of innovation or 
patterns we may or may not expect in other areas or why. It is not clear if the model they 
                                                 
72 Many scholars, as well as the Chinese state, focus on poverty at the county level. Shue and Wong 2007. 
73 Hurst 2006. 
75 Figures based on preliminary estimates from 2010 Census results. National Bureau of Statistics.        
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elucidate applies only to the cases they discuss, or rather if the cases are representative of 
regional types.   
  In addition to a more precise elucidation of scale, the “old regionalists” share a 
conceptual clarity and efforts at abstraction that should serve as models of theory 
building for the new regionalists. Skinner, Locke, and Herrigel elucidate ways in which 
the regions they identify remain resilient in the face of economic, political, and social 
change. These authors were not characterizing regional differences with regard to a single 
outcome, such as urbanization or sectoral investment, but instead endeavored to show 
how regional differences reproduce themselves across sectors and industries and with 
regard to a number of social and political processes. To do this, both Locke and Herrigel 
develop concepts that enable them to abstract out of their specific field sites and identify 
characteristics of “economic orders” that could then be identified elsewhere. Locke does 
this by elaborating three “ideal typical” patterns of economic organization: polycentric, 
polarized, and hierarchical systems, which differ in “the structure of intergroup relations, 
patterns of associationalism, and linkages to central policymakers.”
76 Herrigel identifies 
two “industrial orders.” The “decentralized order” is characterized by a predominance of 
small and medium enterprises and a “system of governance mechanisms that stimulate 
innovation, socialize risk, and foster adjustment…in ways that do not resemble the 
governing principles of either markets or hierarchies.”
77 The autarkic order, on the other 
hand, fits the more traditional view of German industrialization: “dominated by very 
large scale, vertically integrated enterprises, with close ties to universal banks.”
78  
                                                 
76 Locke 1995, 25. 
77 Herrigel 1996, 1. 
78 Herrigel 1996, 2.      
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Only Donaldson’s and Thun’s books involve this kind of effort at conceptual 
innovation. Donaldson characterizes Yunnan province’s approach to growth and poverty 
as emblematic of a “developmental state:” “The Yunnan government approached 
development primarily by altering the market, investing resources in key industries, 
focusing on large-scale industrialization, and attempting to shift labor from agriculture to 
industry” (p. 153). In contrast, he characterizes Guizhou as the “micro-oriented state:” 
focusing on small-scale development strategies, the Guizhou effort sought specifically to 
“reduce poverty by increasing accessible opportunities for poor people” (p. 163). Thun 
situates his cases along two dimensions: bureaucratic organization (fragmented or 
unified) and the form of inter-firm relations (hierarchical or market coordination). From 
here he determines that Shanghai, enjoying hierarchical coordination and a unified 
bureaucracy, is a local developmental state; Changchun and Wuhan have hierarchical 
coordination but fragmented bureaucracies, and are therefore “firm-dominated localities;” 
and Guangzhou and Beijing both have market coordination and fragmented 
bureaucracies, a combination which produces “laissez-faire” local governments (pp. 26-
27). Regrettably, the other books do not contain systematic efforts to abstract out of the 
cases at hand. To be fair, the empirical richness contained in each case discussion might 
trade off with the authors’ abilities to generalize outside their cases. Nonetheless, some 
characterizations of regional variation read more like descriptions of idiosyncratic cases 
rather than the identification of variables or mechanisms that can be found to operate 
similarly in other cases. The fact that Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai constitute 
central cases in three of these books also compromises the authors’ abilities to generalize      
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or identify conceptual types, since these may be “some of China’s most atypical cities” 
(pp. 464-5).
82  
  Whether from a constructivist or structural standpoint, the new regionalists share 
with the old the core contentions that Chinese regions experience endogenous 
transformation and that not only economic outcomes vary by region, but the very rules of 
decision-making vary regionally as well. These two contentions, read alongside one 
another, implore us to take seriously heterogeneity of units in comparing across regions 
in China and caution us against assuming that changes in central policy or incentives will 
affect all areas in similar ways. The presence and reproduction of these different 
economic orders, however, begs the question of their genesis. 
 
Whither Socialist Legacies? 
If the authors of these books disagree on the causal mechanisms that account for 
regional differences, most are in agreement regarding the origins of those mechanisms. 
With the exception of Donaldson, who chooses cases so as to control for socialist 
legacies, all of these authors emphasize the ways in which institutions, ideas, and social 
relations at the subnational level are under the shadow of the Maoist period. No one with 
basic knowledge of the Maoist period would claim that socialist legacies are immaterial 
to the organization of the economy in contemporary China. Yet, deploying “socialist 
legacies” as the key explanatory variable for regional economic diversity seems 
unsatisfying or at least incomplete for several reasons.  
                                                 
82 Though clearly Segal, Thun, and Breznitz & Murphree were writing books about specific industries, and 
therefore leaving these cities out would have omitted the key loci of the phenomena they wanted to explain.      
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First, some presumed “socialist legacies,” upon some consideration, seem to 
themselves be products of pre-socialist forms of organization. Consider Susan Whiting’s 
treatment of Maoist-era rural industrialization and its effects on forms of property rights 
after reforms. She finds that, ironically given the CCP’s emphasis on “self-reliant” rural 
industry during the Great Leap Forward, the Commune and Brigade Enterprises (CBEs) 
that were most “self-reliant” were attacked as capitalist, and others benefitted from 
substantial state support. In the case in which enterprises were attacked or denied state 
support—Yueqing County in Zhejiang Province—Whiting finds a predominance of 
private ownership as a result of a weak collective industrial endowment at the outset of 
reforms. In the cases in which Maoist era enterprises received the most central support—
Songjiang County outside Shanghai and Wuxi County in Jiangsu Province—rural 
enterprises are predominantly publicly owned (pp. 40-71). Whiting’s finding that many 
CBEs enjoyed central state support was in itself a major contribution to understandings of 
rural industrialization under Mao and after his death, but the Yueqing story begs the 
question: why, during the Maoist era, were Yueqing’s CBEs and those in Songjiang and 
Wuxi more often collective? Given, moreover, that Zhejiang Province receives 
significant praise for its famed entrepreneurship and dynamic private economy,
84 one 
wonders if something runs deeper in the region’s economic culture, diaspora connections, 
or pattern of economic organization that explains the rise of private enterprises before, 
during, and after the Maoist period.  
Other times, these “legacies” seem more likely to be products of post-1978 
changes. Take, for example, Thun’s discussion of institutional heritage in Shanghai. In 
arguing that institutional legacies matter long after “differences have been smoothed 
                                                 
84 Liu 1992, Parris 1993.      
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over,” Thun relies on the key contention of the historical institutionalist school of thought 
that “institutions are shaped over time and change only slowly” (p. 36).
85 He is worth 
quoting at length: 
The path-dependent nature of institutional change is not new, but it has important 
implications for development policy. If a region has an institutional advantage (or 
disadvantage) it is the product of decades of political and economic history, and in 
the absence of strong external pressure it is unlikely that policymakers will be 
able to easily change this advantage, either to conform to the whims of policy 
fashions, or to satisfy the needs of an evolving economic sector. (p. 37)  
 
Yet, the story he tells about local state “developmentalism” in Shanghai does not accord 
with this account of institutional stasis. On the contrary, he describes how the municipal 
government “fine-tuned the bureaucratic structure so as to be able to effectively 
coordinate and monitor developmental efforts” (p. 107), including a reorganization of the 
bureaucracy charged automobile industry oversight and the establishment of new offices 
in charge of localizing supply (pp. 107-116). This seemingly rapid institutional 
innovation suggests that some municipal governments are indeed capable of overhauling 
existing institutions to pursue growth in certain sectors, albeit conforming to long 
established patterns of state investment.
89  
This does not mean, of course, that socialist legacies cannot determine patterns of 
state intervention in the economy or even change in economic organization. Rather, 
precise theoretical propositions involving the enduring power of socialist legacies would 
require clear articulation of the mechanisms through which legacies from the socialist 
period—be they institutional or ideational—are reproduced. All of these books include 
                                                 
85 Thun p. 36. See Pierson 2000, Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierson 2004, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 
1992.  
89 To be fair, “socialist legacy” is hardly the only variable that he uses to explain different municipal 
models of automobile industry promotion. He also emphasizes a locale’s relationship with the central 
government in Beijing, and in particular how institutional legacies evolve given that relationship.      
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examples of what could be “feedback mechanisms” or increasing returns: for example, 
Hurst’s analysis of “mobilizing structures” foregrounds housing compounds and 
apartment blocks established during the state socialist period as an ecological asset in 
organizing worker contention (pp. 108-132). Another tack would be clearer specification 
of how institutional change actually can serve to reify original differences among 
regions. For example, the literature on transitions in the post-communist world has for 
decades emphasized how communist (and pre-communist) legacies may have influenced 
levels of democratic consolidation across East and Central Europe. Yet scholars of this 
region have been involved in extensive debates about how to characterize and theorize 
the causal effects of “legacies,” pre- and post-communist.
91 Of course, the communist 
experience (and the transition from communism) was more varied among the countries of 
the Soviet bloc than within China, but China scholars would do well to specify and 
theorize the causal power of Chinese socialist legacies with the same care.  
Perhaps ironically, it is Whiting who both offers the strongest explanation of the 
reproduction of socialist legacies as well as the most space for those legacies to be 
overridden in a dynamic process of institutional change. The conclusion to her book 
discusses how much of rural China converged on the privatization of rural industrial 
enterprises in the late 1990s as the central government in Beijing changed the rules of the 
fiscal system that permitted local divergence: “when substantial change occurs in the 
larger institutional environment, dramatic and seemingly disjunct change can occur in the 
paths of local institutional development” (p. 267). What would it take to change these 
legacies in institutional, ideational, and socio-political models of regional variation in 
China? Certainly, these books are convincing that there is continuity in regional 
                                                 
91 See Bunce 2003, Bunce 2005, Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006, Wittenberg 2006.      
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approaches to development, across time and across sectors. Breznitz & Murphree 
characterize regional approaches to the IT sector in largely similar ways to Segal, who 
wrote eight years earlier.  
Taking inspiration from Whiting’s attention to institutional change, the field of 
political economy in China might also turn its attention to the ways in which changes to 
the post-Mao administrative hierarchy has made the rules of economic organization 
irrevocably different across different subnational regions in China. Regardless of how we 
conceptualize socialist legacies, we can agree that the politics of growth, investment, and 
state-society relations are very different in places that opened early and widely to market 
reforms and global capital. Localities in central and western China, in this view, are not 
simply playing “catch-up” to their eastern counterparts, but—for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the socialist past and everything to do with the course of reforms—
they have no eastern counterparts. Subnational localities may belong to “regions” that are 
not spatial representations, but rather categories of cities according to maneuvering 
ability vis-à-vis the central government.
93  
The books discussed in this essay feature many references to how the post-1978 
reforms have affected regions differently, for example in central-local relations, timing 
and sequencing of reform, and degree of foreign opening. Yet these reform era factors are 
neglected relative to the attention afforded to socialist legacies. As research on political 
economies in China achieves greater granularity and academics broaden their field sites, 
it is worth considering—as systematically as possible—whether and how the outcomes 
                                                 
93 Geographers have long been attentive to how regions may be deployed as a “subunit of national space 
that may be divided into a variety of abstract divisions depending on the criteria used,” i.e. not really 
contiguous spatial areas in a literal sense. Friedmann and Weaver 1979, Yang 1997, 4.       
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we aim to explain are linked to variables or processes that emerged from the period of 
state socialism or rather from eras before or after Mao. 
  Though I have emphasized the benefits of theorizing endogenous local change in 
China, a final admonition concerns the risks of taking “endogenous change” too far. In an 
effort to uncover subnational variation and reject “whole nation bias,” scholars should 
also be wary of what some call “methodological localism:” an excessive focus on local 
institutions or social processes while neglecting the supralocal power relations in which 
localities are embedded.
94 This could be especially injurious in the Chinese case, since 
perhaps the most intriguing, and least understood, element of China’s political system 
writ large is the interplay between political power at different scales. One of the most 
controversial pieces of scholarship on the origins of the Chinese reforms—Lynn White’s 
Unstately Power (in two volumes, 1998)—attempts to study exactly this. White bristles at 
the idea that the reforms began at the initiation of central authorities in 1978, and instead 
meticulously tracks how local political networks in the city of Shanghai embarked on 
reforms in policy areas ranging from literature to social welfare provision well before 
those reforms had occurred to actors at the center. He argues that, in fact, national 
reforms were in many ways brought about by the actions of local networks: “The 
cumulative influence of countermeasures from many localities, acting in parallel, often 
became national policy not fully intended by the government.”
95 The argument was 
controversial because determining the directionality of policy in China is notoriously 
difficult, yet these interactions between local and central networks are surely at the heart 
of major policy changes.   
                                                 
94 See Brenner 2009. 
95 White 1998, Vol. 1, 8. See Kelliher 1992 and Zhou 1996 for similar arguments about the rural reforms.       
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While we may be unsure of what outcomes are products of local insistence, 
central direction, or, likely, some interaction between different scales, we may be certain 
about what Sebasian Heilmann has called the “shadow of hierarchy:” that the central 
government in Beijing remains at the apex of the Chinese political hierarchy, and various 
local policies and programs must enjoy the center’s support or total neglect in order to 
survive.
96 This lurking power of the center is certainly not dismissed in the books 
reviewed here, but this emerging research agenda on local change enjoys an opportunity 
to bring hierarchy out of the “shadows” and into the foreground of theoretical 
development in Chinese politics. This kind of multi-level theorizing will only be possible 
by taking seriously local heterogeneity but also the central power dynamics that promote 
or inhibit it.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
  In recent years, and especially since the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent 
debt crises in Europe and the United States, many have celebrated the so-called “Beijing 
Consensus” as a Chinese alternative to the “western” path to growth. While some debate 
the viability of a proposed Chinese model,
97 the scholars whose work I discussed in this 
essay reject the idea that a country as large and as diverse as China could possibly 
support one single model of development. Indeed, this scholarship, which goes beyond 
recognizing subnational variation and instead intends to systematically probe its origins, 
marks a certain maturation of theory development in Chinese political economy.  
                                                 
96 Heilmann 2009. 
97 See Huang 2011.      
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Richard Locke’s seminal work on regional variation in the Italian economy was 
initially motivated by an attempt to account for the simultaneous success and failure of 
national efforts at reforms. The period of his study (1970-1990) was a tumultuous one as 
nation states attempted to reform internally to better adjust to changes in the international 
economy. Recent shocks to the international economy and changes in policy in Beijing 
indicate that reforms of a similar scale are on the horizon in China. The proponents of the 
“new regionalism” teach us that possible reforms of everything from the rural and urban 
land tenure systems to municipal government financing to rural modernization to internal 
migration reform will play out very differently sub-nationally. But acknowledging the 
fact of regional variation itself no longer constitutes an advance of knowledge about the 
workings of political economy in China. Instead of simply describing the ways in which 
economic and political outcomes of interest vary sub-nationally, China scholars should 
build on the solid foundation of work discussed here to engage with what institutional, 
ideational, or socio-historical factors bear on differences among comparable subnational 
units.    
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